Ethical Studies, Vol. 10 (1), 2025

INCLUSION ARGUMENT AND THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF

AFRICAN ETHICS

OLUSOLA VICTOR OLANIPEKUN

Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

olanipekuno@oauife.edu.ng

DAVID ABIODUN OYEDOLA

Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

Abstract

This paper critically examines Thaddeus Metz’s account of Masolo’s stance on morality in sub-Saharan Africa. In the “Two Conceptions of African Ethics”, Metz argues that D.A. Masolo’s analysis of sub-Saharan morality suggests two descriptions. The first is the community-based conception and the second is the welfare-based conception. Having examined the logic of both, Metz, therefore, advanced two arguments with which he supported the claim that the community-based conception of sub-Saharan morality is more plausible than the welfare-based counterpart. The first is the argument about the relevance of the past decisions, and the second is the argument about non-harmful wrongdoing. However, this paper argues that Metz’s two arguments above do not provide sufficient grounds for establishing the claim that the community-based conception of sub-Saharan morality is more plausible than the welfare-based counterpart. The paper argues that there is more to be found than Metz suggested. It founds that strengthening the inclusion-argument that Metz seems not to pay adequate attention to has the tendency of showing how and why the nature of the community-based conception of African ethics could makes it more characteristically African than the welfare-based conception.

Keywords: African Ethics, Community, Welfare, Sub-Saharan Morality, Personhood.

Introduction

Thaddeus Metz is one of the leading scholars whose immense contributions in the area of African ethics, value theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion cannot be over-emphasized. One of his outstanding contributions in the area of African ethics is “Two Conceptions of African Ethics”. Metz’s critical engagement and reflective insights into Masolo’s Self and Community in a Changing World (2010) opens wide range of issues that require further reflections in African philosophical community about sub-Saharan morality. One quick question that comes to mind is that, is morality in sub-Saharan African societies different from morality in other part of the world? The response to this question has been dealt with extensively by scholars such as Wiredu, Gyekye, Masolo and others in different ways. Besides, what is common in the world of scholarship is the general attitude that morality is often discussed from two important standpoints. It is either it is discussed from the perspective-driven or what some call particularistic point of view, or from the universalist stand-point. In any case, this controversy is evident in definitions that shall be considered by different scholars.

The essential nature of morality, as Wiredu warns, is that “any society without medium of morality must collapse.” (Wiredu, 1998:337). This statement is a truism of a sort especially when one considers the condition of man in the state of nature as painted by Thomas Hobbes, and as evident in our experience in actual human societies. As Gyekye observes:

The ethics of a society is embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a good or bad character; it is also embedded in the conceptions of satisfactory social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is embedded, furthermore, in the forms or patterns of behavior that are considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living, justice, and fairness. (Gyekye,2011:1).

Gyekye’s point can be interpreted to mean that different societies have different standards of moral evaluation. He argues further that the ethics of a typical African society rests on the ideas, beliefs and the standards of moral evaluation of the African people. A careful examination of Metz’s analysis of Masolo’s moral philosophy reveals that scholars in African philosophical community do not agree about the conception of morality in sub-Saharan Africa. The reason could be due to the fact that philosophers never seems to agree on issues because they think from different perspectives of the reality before them. This arises from the variations in the interpretations and understanding of any giving subject matter. The same controversial nature of philosophy manifested in the conceptions of morality in sub-Saharan Africa as evident in the works of Masolo and Metz.

This paper is divided into three main sections. After revisiting some definitions of African ethics, the first section focuses on Metz’s two conceptions of sub-Saharan morality.[1] In this section, both the welfare-based and the community-based conceptions of African ethics will be discussed. Second section considers Metz’s arguments for the plausibility of the community-based conception. This is where the ‘argument about relevance of past decisions’ and the ‘non-harmful wrongdoing argument’ will be discussed. This will be done with the aim to critically appraise Metz’s arguments in support of the plausibility of the community-based conception. Meanwhile, in the last section, we introduced the inclusion argument to strengthen Metz’s position. Now, before delving into different conceptions of African ethics, it is imperative to start on a convenient note where definitions of African ethics will be revisited.

A Synopsis of African Ethics

What is African ethics? For Gyekye, African ethics is referred to the moral beliefs and presuppositions of the sub-Saharan African people and the philosophical clarification and interpretation of those beliefs and presupposition. (Gyekye, 2011:1). Gyekye posits that African ethics is concerned with salient features or ideas of the African moral life and thought generally as reflected in, or generated by, African moral language and social structure and life. (Gyekye, 2011). Meanwhile, for Molefe, African ethics refers to general and salient moral intuitions that are considered to be salient below the Sahara. (Molefe, 2016:104-105).

In Metz’s opinion, moral theory counts as African if it is informed not so much by Western cultures, but rather by many of the long-standing ethical beliefs and practices of a variety of peoples in the large sub-Saharan African region. (Metz, 2022:114). Essentially, Metz argues that African ethics is concerned with wide array of the moral judgements and ways of life found among many of the cultures indigenous to the sub-Saharan African region. (Metz, 2022:114). Also, Metz argues that, African ethics, roughly, is one that is grounded in the moral beliefs of many of the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. (Azenabor,2007:331). Meanwhile, Azenabor argues that African ethics is the conceptualization, appropriation, contextualization, and analysis of African values within the African cultural experience. (Azenabor, 2008:229). Essentially, one thing is common to the above array of definitions. What is deducible from the definitions is that African ethics is a form of ethics that arises from the peculiar experiences of the sub-Saharan people. As hinted by Metz, it is important to understand that many African scholars including Masolo conceives personhood as, of course, the conceptual category through which it is natural to enter into discussion of African thought about ethics. (Metz, 2014:114). The point here is that the more morally conscious you become, the more person you become in terms of degree. This is not really our primary focus in this paper. Now, what are the two main conceptions of African ethics? Let us move to the next section to consider the two conceptions of sub-Saharan morality identified by Metz.

Metz on Two Conceptions of African Ethics [Personhood]^[2]: Welfare vs. Community

– Community-Based Conception: According to this conception of morality, community is the basic moral value. Thus, community should be valued for its own sake. (Metz, 2014:141). That is, the community provides guidelines that determine what is morally right and morally wrong. In other words, community is morally supreme. In case of moral clash between the community and individual rights, community should be preferred.

For Metz, in ‘community-based’ conception, one lives a genuinely human way of life just insofar as one enters into or prizes community with others. (Metz, 2014:148). This theory ‘posits the existence of others as an essential part of the very structure of the self’, such that realizing one’s true nature is nothing over and above living communally. (Metz, 2010:249). The above view suggests that given that the standard of moral evaluation is communal, one’s moral nature as a human being hinges on one’s relationship with others and what the community dictates.

There are passages in Masolo’s work indicating that personhood [moral agent] is constituted by, and not merely caused by, certain relationships with other human beings. The relevant relationships for Masolo and the African tradition, more generally, are communal ones, which he sometimes sums up as ‘cohesion’. (Metz, 2010:240).

As Metz puts it, Masolo also argues that:

community-based value lies in the general or common conditions of relations that results from it, not just in this specific example but in all other cases and examples of good neighborliness….sociomoral states that every child is taught and that every right-thinking person is called upon to consider implementing as the objective of his or everyday conduct…..A life of cohesion, or positive integration with others, becomes a goal, one that people design modalities for achieving. (Metz, 2010:240).

The above view by Masolo is not really different from what Metz calls relational ethic in “Towards African Moral Theory” (2007). Positive integration with others, and good neighbourliness are essential factors for community-based conceptions of morality.

– Welfare-Based Conception: This conception of morality/personhood suggests that welfare is the basic moral value. This conception of morality implies that the ultimate aim of a moral agent should be to improve people’s quality of life. (Metz, 2014:141). Also, for Metz, welfare-based conception states that one is more of a person, when acts to improve the quality of life of others. (Metz, 2010:150). The above view implies that the standard of moral evaluation is connected to the welfare capability of the moral agent. Should in case there is a moral clash between communal value and individual welfare, individual welfare should be preferred.

In Gyekye’s view, African ethics, is a humanitarian ethics, it is the kind of ethics that places a great deal of emphasis on human welfare. The concern for human welfare may be said to constitute the hub of the African axiological wheel. (Gyekye, 2011:2). The above view reveals Gyekye as one the good supporters of the welfare-based conception. In a clearer way, Gyekye claims that African morality is founded on humanism, the doctrine that considers human interests and welfare as basic to the thought and action of the people. (Gyekye, 2011). The welfare-based theory says that one should share one’s wealth, time, labour and so on at bottom because doing so is likely to make others’ lives go better. (Metz, 2014:151). Thus, welfare is the basic moral value.

Meanwhile, Bewaji posits that morality and ethics in Western and non-Western societies have similar importance in that, human social and interpersonal behavior is under the necessity of the adjustment of interests among individuals for attaining the general well-being of the community. (Bewaji, 2004:396). In Onuche’s view, (African)Nigerian ethics is a humanitarian ethics, the kind of ethics that places a great deal of emphasis on human welfare. The concern for human welfare may be said to constitute the hub of the (African)Nigerian axiological wheel. (Onuche, Ojochonu, Okpe, 2018:4). The above view by Onuche is a restatement of Gyekye’s position on African ethics.

Now, having considered the two conceptions of African ethics, what are those arguments with which Metz defended the plausibility of the community-based conception of African ethics? Answer to this question shall be the focus of the next section.

Metz’s Arguments for the Plausibility of the Community-Based Conception

Having examined the logic of the two conceptions, Metz concludes that community-based account of morality/personhood is able to account for widely held moral judgments that a welfare-based one cannot. (Metz, 2014:153). The followings are Metz’s main reasons:

I. The community-based conception is philosophically plausible;

II. The community-based conception is more characteristically African than the welfare one. (Metz, 2014:143).

Interestingly, the main reasons shown above are expressed by the following two general considerations advanced by Metz. Meanwhile, Metz, as a matter of fact, considers these two arguments to be adequate reason for rejecting welfare-based conception.

The Argument from the Relevance of the Past Decisions

The first main argument for the plausibility of the community-based conception is the argument from the relevance of the past decisions. In Metz’s view, unlike the welfare-based one, community-based conception can account for the moral relevance of decisions people have taken. This has to do with the intuition that sometimes the way we should treat someone in the present is, to a large degree, a function of how that person voluntarily acted in the past. (Metz, 2014:151). This implies that community-based conception accommodates how past actions or behaviours play vital roles in determining present treatment. This view suggests treating someone in an antisocial manner if it is necessary to prevent or compensate for their own antisocial behaviour. Metz is of the view that welfare-based conception cannot account for such relevance of the past decisions. The implication is that community-based conception of morality in sub-Saharan African aligns with intuitions about punishment, self-defense, and rationing, where past actions play vital role in determining present treatment. There is a reciprocity and trust in the communal setting due to continuous interaction that takes place among people. Besides, morality, for the supporters of the community-based conception, involves recognition of individual’s relations and interactions within the community with emphasis on collective responsibility.

However, contrary to Metz’s view, critics could argue that one need not use the past actions to judge the present in all cases in the community. The aim could be to suggest that when judging moral actions, past actions may not necessarily be relevant at all times. The reason is because change is constant and human beings are subject to change. Morality, itself, is not static. Also, that a man made a bad moral choice in the past does not necessarily mean he cannot change his ways. For instance, A thief of yesterday may change to become a good person today who will contribute meaningfully to the development and wellbeing of the entire society today.

Similarly, question may be asked; what about the past actions that are irrelevant to the present and future? Would the community-based conception account for such too? This is one vital question that Metz omitted or failed to address when developing this first argument. The implication of such omission is that this could lead to a problem of selective accountability if pursued to a logical conclusion. The reason is because, it is a truism that some past actions are relevant to the present and future while there are others that do not. Why do we need to account for some and leave some?

Now, one possible way by which Metz could respond to the above objections is that community-based conception of morality supports social accountability. This sense of accountability is said to contribute to responsible actions that will help individual ethical decision-making process in the community. In other words, people should not jettison social responsibility in the name of individual welfare.

Argument from Non-Harmful Wrongdoing

The second argument, according to Metz, for the plausibility of the community-based conception is that it, unlike the welfare-based one, can account for the non-harmful wrongdoing. According to Metz:

a second class of actions that the welfare-based view cannot easily accommodate, namely, those in which one agent does something to another, albeit without her knowledge that anything has changed. In many of these kinds of cases, it is plausible to maintain that the other’s well-being is not reduced, but that the action is wrong or a vice nonetheless. (Metz, 2014:143).

The above view is a description of a situation whereby wrong action that is presumed to be non-harmful is performed. In other words, Metz’s view is that, the welfare-based conception could not account for the moral wrongness of actions that do not visibly reduce the well-being but still violate moral principles of respect and community. As Metz opines, if we:

consider the case of a spouse who systematically cheats on you behind your back, and is so careful and conniving that you have virtually no chance of finding out … Or suppose that I break into your house in order to sleep in your bed, listen to your stereo and bathe in your tub while you are away at work, taking care to ensure that things are organized so that you can never know I was there. I presume that readers, whether working in African or Western traditions, believe that these actions are wrong, at least to some substantial degree. (Metz, 2014:157-158).

The point Metz is making with the above examples is that these acts are morally wrong from the community-based conception. But for him, a welfare-based defender may not see anything wrong in them so long as these acts do not hinder or reduce anyone’s welfare.

However, critics may argue that- to claim that a community-based conception is more plausible than the welfare-based counterpart on the ground that the later could not account for “non-harmful wrongdoing” is to have a lopsided view of the welfare-based conception. The reason is because, the supporters of welfare-based conception like the utilitarians will only support non-harmful wrong doing on the condition that such action would promote people’s welfare. I do not think that the welfare-based supporters will support non-harmful wrong doing if they know that such action will not promote people’s welfare. For instance, if we follow Metz’s examples, the welfare-based supporters will not accept the first example given by Metz because due to the possibility of sexual transmitted diseases (STD), a spouse who is cheating behind your back is endangering your welfare as the innocent partner. Also, the supporters of welfare-based could also disagree with Metz’s third example because, -an intruder that break into your house in order to sleep in your bed, listen to your stereo and bathe in your tub while you are away at work, taking care to ensure that things are organized so that you can never know he was there- could be endangering your wellbeing in case he/she unknowingly has infections such as COVID-19 or Ebola that could be transferred to you from your bed. Thus, one can meaningfully discuss community-based conception without recourse to this kind of argument.

How strong is Thaddeus Metz’s arguments for the plausibility of the community-based conception of African ethics? We contend that the two arguments are necessary, but not sufficient in defending the claim of Metz. Besides, the paper argues that these two arguments are not the only arguments that are available in supporting Metz’s claim. In the next section, we shall consider an additional argument to strengthens Metz’s claim.

Further Argument in Defence of the Plausibility of the Community-Based Conception

It was argued earlier, first, we do not deny the logic of Metz’s claim that the community-based conception is more characteristically African than the welfare one. The reason is because such claim is not strange to anyone who is grounded in the sub-Saharan African traditional world view. Second, as it has been shown in the previous section, it is possible to disagree with Metz about the strength and sufficiency of the two arguments with which he established the claim. It is argued that in addition to those two arguments, there are other possible ways by which Metz’s claim could be supported. This led to the development of what is called the inclusion argument.

The Inclusion Argument

Basically, ‘inclusion argument’[3] is conceived to mean that there is an element of welfare in the community-based conception. That is, community-based conception already includes or accommodates element of welfare. Metz describes the community-based conception as the view that community should be valued for its own sake, with the enhancement of welfare being morally relevant only insofar as it is part of that. (Metz, 2014:143). On a careful consideration, the point inherent in the above view is stronger than the two earlier arguments with which Metz defended the plausibility of the community-based conception. In our view, good communal relationship that is often emphasized under community- based conception already implies wellbeing of the members of the community that are involved in the communal relationship. For instance, someone who shares genuine communal relationship with you will be thinking about your wellbeing and not about how to harm you or steal your property for his/her own selfish reason. The reason is because stealing your property or harming you will not be an act done in the spirit of good communal relationship or personhood.

The submission is that, any of the two competing conceptions under consideration that is capable to maintain its own position, and could also accommodate element of the other conception should be considered more plausible. The community-based conception is found more capable of doing this. This is possible because community could be valued for its own sake without jettisoning the moral relevance of the welfare of the people. It should be noted that one essential feature of any morally responsible and responsive community is the wellbeing of the members. Community, in this sense, actually means the people -which is beyond a mere geographical expression or location. Besides, community-based conception of morality is more natural with sub-Saharan African people because of its emphasis on common good and communal relationship unlike the welfare conception that emphasizes individualism or self in the long run. But, interestingly, sub-Saharan African community is not characteristically individualistic in nature.

In another development, conceiving the community as an end in itself encompasses the general expectations including welfare. It is on this note that one could conclude that it is not irrational to argue that community-based conception accommodates welfare-based. In fact, the scholars who support welfare-based conception also belong to a particular community that shapes their lives including their moral world view. This view arises from the communitarian traditional position that every individual is naturally born by members of a community, and into a family setting which is the unit of a community/society and whose personhood is defined by interaction with others in the community. Whereas, the welfare-based could not achieve all these.

Similarly, another reason why community-based conception is more preferred is connected to the intuition that welfare-based conception eventually finds meaning through the community-based conception. How? The reason for the above claim is that it is through the same community that the idea of what “welfare” is, is shaped. This view is not unconnected to the school of thought that welfare is relative in time and place. That is, what each people/community call welfare is relative to them, and that there is no universal conception of welfare in all cases. That is, sub-Saharan African conception of “good life” or “welfare” is a function of the community perspective of the “good”. Thus, whatever members of the community will consider to be a conception of good life or welfare must be what the community approves.

In his work, “African and Western Moral Theories in a Bioethical Context”, Metz describes African standard of moral evaluation as follows; “an action is morally right in so far as it is a way of living harmoniously or prizing communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with another; otherwise, an action is wrong.” (Metz, 2010:51). The above view expresses the community-based conception of African ethics with welfare as part of its package. Interestingly, scholars who support community-based conception also acknowledged the place of individual wellbeing. They do not deny the moral relevance of welfare, but they mainly claim that welfare is not the only and primary thing. A critic may argue that Metz himself acknowledged that community is not reducible to welfare. Thus, is this not pointing to the fact that Metz reject welfare? The response is negative. Even though Metz argues that community is not reducible to welfarism, he does not, in any way, deny the moral relevance of welfare in the community.

Furthermore, the community-based conception considers the holistic welfare of the community instead of mere concentrating only on the well-being of the individual, it tackles questions of justice, inequality and makes sure that the moral framework takes into account the needs of many. (Metz, 2014:141). What is characteristically African is the pursuit of the holistic welfare of the entire community and not the pursuit of an individual wellbeing.

Critics may charge community-based conception of morality in sub-Sahara Africa of partiality as Molefe did. According to him, “it strikes me that this theory is unable to accord primary consideration to agent-related partiality.” (Molefe, 2017:54). That is, a community-based conception is not free from the problem of partiality. Nevertheless, one could easily respond to the above charge that such charge is not really convincing because the welfare-based conception is not also free from the same charge of partiality. In some cases, welfare theorists are not always agent-neutral as they often claim. In fact, it has been proven that utilitarianism is not as partialist as it claims. Also, taking example from the COVID-19 pandemic period, it is surprising to see how some welfare-states paid more attention to their own citizens above strangers. This is not a demonstration of impartiality.

Just like Metz, this paper submitted that given the nature of the community-based conception of sub-Saharan African morality, this conception is more African in nature than the welfare-based counterpart. Aside the argument about relevance of past decisions, and the argument about non-harmful wrongdoing that the welfare-based conception could not account for, inclusion argument is also another means of defending the claim that community-based conception is more plausible than its welfare-based counterpart.

Conclusion

The paper examined Thaddeus Metz’s account of Masolo’s discussion of morality in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the “Two Conceptions of African Ethics”, Metz argued that D.A. Masolo’s analysis of Sub-Saharan morality suggests two major ways. The first is the community-based conception, and the second, is the welfare-based conception. Having examined the logic of both, Metz, claimed that the community-based conception of Sub-Saharan morality is more plausible than the welfare-based counterpart with two arguments. First, argument about relevance of past decisions, two, non-harmful wrongdoing argument. However, even though, the paper also aligned with Metz on the claim that community-based conception of morality is more plausible, it argued that that (i) Metz’s two arguments in support of the claim are not sufficient in establishing such claim. The paper argued that in maintaining such claim, there is more to be found than Metz suggested. Hence, the need for further or additional argument to strengthen Metz’s position. (ii)By introducing the inclusion argument, the paper concluded that the nature of the community-based conception makes it more plausible than the welfare-based conception.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Many thanks to Professor Metz whose insightful analysis of Masolo’s Self and Community in a Changing World motivates us to come up with this contribution.

NOTES

[1] Note that the conception of morality in sub-Saharan Africa was used in connection with the conception of personhood by Masolo. The two are also used interchangeably in this paper.

[2] For both Masolo and Metz, “African Ethics” and “Personhood in the African context” are conceived to be interconnected. The reason is because ethics/morality in sub-Saharan African is best understood in connection with the concept of personhood. In fact, both Masolo and Metz occasionally used the two concepts interchangeably. But for the purpose of this paper, I will stick to “African Ethics”. For details, See Thaddeus Metz, “Two Conceptions of African Ethics”, p.144, Also, see Masolo, D.A. Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

[3] This inclusion argument is not a totally new concept. In fact, it was gleaned from Metz’s idea on page 142 of the “Two Conceptions of African Ethics”. However, even though Metz mentioned the idea of inclusion argument in passing and glossed over it, he did not stress this view to defend the plausibility of the community-based conception over the welfare based. In our view, Metz should have developed and strongly presented this idea to support the claim. This paper attempts to fill that gap.

 

REFERENCES

Azenabor, G. (2008). African Golden Rule principle and Kant’s Categorical Imperative. In: An African Journal of Philosophy, Quest, vol. XXL, (Vol.1): 229-240.

Bewaji, J. A. (2004). Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture. In: K. Wiredu (ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, p.396.

Gyekye, K. (2011). African Ethics. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward. N. Zalta (ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics.

Masolo, D.A. (2010). Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Metz, T. (2022) African Ethics and Public Governance: Nepotism, Preferential Hiring, and Other Partiality. In: K. Ogunyemi, I. Adisa , R. E. Hinson (eds.), Ethics and Accountable Governance in Africa’s Public Sector, Volume I, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p.114.

Metz, T. (2007). Towards an African Moral Theory. In: The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol.15, (No.1): 321–341.

Metz, T. (2007). The Motivation for “Toward an African Moral Theory”. In: South African Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, (No.4): 331-335.

Metz, T. (2014). Two Conceptions of African Ethics. In: Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy / Revue de Philosophie Africaine, vol. 25, (No.1-2):141.

Metz, T. (2010). African and Western Moral Theories in A Bioethical Context. In: Developing World Bioethics, vol.10, No. 1, (2010): 51.

Molefe, M. (2016). African Ethics and Partiality. In: Phronimon, vol.17, (No.1):104-22.

Molefe M. (2017). Relational Ethics and Partiality: A Critique of Thad Metz’s Towards an African Moral Theory. In Theoria, vol.64, (No.152):54.

Onuche, J., Okpanachi E. O. and N. Okpe (2018). Moral Relativism and The Nigerian Moral Context. In: Journal of humanities and cultures studies R&D, Vol.3, (No.3): 4.

Wiredu, K. (1998). The Moral Foundation of African Culture. In: P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, The African Philosophy Reader. New York: Routledge. p.337-338.